Use case: mobility and logistics

Protecting GNSS-dependent operations against jamming and spoofing

Protection starts with knowing where operations depend on GNSS, including hidden dependencies such as network time servers. Receivers are then placed and chosen with care, signals are monitored, authenticated Galileo navigation data helps detect spoofing, and an independent backup such as a holdover clock or inertial navigation bridges an outage.

Reference
UC-22
Technologies
  • Satellite navigation
Industry
Challenge
Connectivity, positioning and timing
Updated
Published by
LETO SPACE

01When you need it

Why GNSS interference is a business risk

GNSS gives position and time to vehicles, vessels, machines, telecom networks and power grids. Its signals reach the ground below the level of ambient noise, so even a weak interference source can disturb a receiver Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk). EASA describes two forms of deliberate interference Source: European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 3 July 2026European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) outages and alterations3 July 2026Open source (opens easa.europa.eu):

  • Jamming: radio interference that prevents a receiver from locking onto the satellite signals, so the service is lost or degraded.
  • Spoofing: counterfeit satellite signals that make a receiver compute a wrong position, navigation or time.

The effects range from reduced accuracy to sudden jumps in time, position or direction. A receiver that keeps reporting can pass hazardously misleading information into the systems that rely on it. Systems that take precise time from GNSS are usually automated and often unattended, which puts them at greater risk Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk).

Latest EASA bulletin on GNSS interference
SIB 2022-02R4, 3 July 2026
Attempted cyberattacks on shipping since February 2020, incl. GNSS jamming and spoofing
fourfold increase
Galileo OSNMA operational since
24 July 2025

The figures come from EASA Source: European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 3 July 2026European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) outages and alterations3 July 2026Open source (opens easa.europa.eu), the EUSPA EO and GNSS Market Report 2024, which refers to the maritime sector Source: EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), 2024EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA)EUSPA EO and GNSS Market Report, Issue 2, 20242024Open source (opens euspa.europa.eu), and EUSPA Source: EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), 5 September 2025EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA)From Testing to Operations: Galileo OSNMA Service Now Available to Users5 September 2025Open source (opens euspa.europa.eu). EASA reports a notable increase in jamming and spoofing since February 2022 and names the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Baltic Sea and the Arctic among the areas affected Source: European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 3 July 2026European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) outages and alterations3 July 2026Open source (opens easa.europa.eu).

02Technology

How protection works

Protection works in four layers. None of them is enough alone.

  1. Know the dependence. Even vigilant operators may not be fully aware of how much they rely on GNSS. Systems that look independent, such as some network time services, can take their time from GNSS receivers. The UK Blackett review therefore recommends that operators of critical infrastructure review their reliance on GNSS, direct or through other systems Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk).
  2. Harden the receiver. Stationary receivers are more exposed than mobile ones. An antenna with a full view of the sky, mounted away from roads, avoids many cases of interference. Professional receivers check the veracity of signals, while mass-market components easily fall prey to interference Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk).
  3. Detect and authenticate. Systems that monitor the radio spectrum detect jamming and spoofing and alert users Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk). Galileo OSNMA lets civilian receivers verify that the navigation data is authentic Source: EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), 5 September 2025EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA)From Testing to Operations: Galileo OSNMA Service Now Available to Users5 September 2025Open source (opens euspa.europa.eu). In aviation, EASA asks operators to cross-check the position with non-GNSS navigation aids and to report spoofing events Source: European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 3 July 2026European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) outages and alterations3 July 2026Open source (opens easa.europa.eu).
  4. Bridge the outage. When GNSS is lost, a holdover oscillator, such as a crystal, rubidium or caesium clock, keeps time for a while, and an inertial navigation system keeps estimating the position Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk). The review recommends GNSS-independent backup systems for critical infrastructure Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk).
Where the four layers of protection act: layers 1 and 4 (know the dependence, bridge the outage) protect your systems, layer 2 hardens the receiver, and layer 3 (detect and authenticate) covers the signal and the receiver. Jamming and spoofing act on the link between the satellites and the receiver. Schematic drawing. Source: UK Government Office for Science

How timing for power grids is designed, including Galileo as a second source next to GPS, is covered under precise timing for power grids. Our page on what GNSS is explains the basics.

03Deliverables

What you get

  • An inventory of every system that takes position or time from GNSS, including indirect dependencies.
  • Requirements for accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity per application, as the Blackett review recommends for procurers Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk).
  • Detection of jamming and spoofing, with alarms that reach the people who act on them.
  • A fallback for each critical dependency, with the time it has to bridge.

04Limits

Limits

05Next steps

How we help

We find out where your operations depend on GNSS and what a loss or a false signal would cost in each case. In requirements and procurement we specify receivers, detection and backups and compare providers against them. In implementation we test the fallback before it is needed.

To see who offers space-enabled solutions, use Spacegraph, our discovery platform.

06Use cases

Frequently asked questions

Q1What is the difference between jamming and spoofing?

Jamming is radio interference that prevents a receiver from locking onto the satellite signals, so position and time are lost or degraded. Spoofing broadcasts counterfeit satellite signals, so the receiver computes a wrong position, navigation or time Source: European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 3 July 2026European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) outages and alterations3 July 2026Open source (opens easa.europa.eu). A spoofed receiver keeps delivering a position, and the system may not be able to tell that it has been compromised Source: UK GO-Science, UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018UK Government Office for ScienceSatellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review)30 January 2018Open source (opens gov.uk).

Q2Does Galileo protect against spoofing?

Galileo's Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) has been operational since 24 July 2025. It lets civilian receivers check that the navigation data they use is authentic Source: EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), 5 September 2025EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA)From Testing to Operations: Galileo OSNMA Service Now Available to Users5 September 2025Open source (opens euspa.europa.eu). This helps a receiver detect spoofed signals. It does not help against jamming, so a backup is still needed.

Q3How do we start?

Start with an inventory: which systems take position or time from GNSS, directly or through other systems, and what happens in each of them when the signal is lost or false. From there we define requirements and a fallback for each critical dependency. Our consulting overview shows the path from the problem to operation.

Sources (4)

  1. European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 3 July 2026Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) outages and alterations (opens easa.europa.eu)
  2. UK Government Office for Science, 30 January 2018Satellite-derived time and position: a study of critical dependencies (Blackett review) (opens gov.uk)
  3. EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), 5 September 2025From Testing to Operations: Galileo OSNMA Service Now Available to Users (opens euspa.europa.eu)
  4. EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), 2024EUSPA EO and GNSS Market Report, Issue 2, 2024 (opens euspa.europa.eu)

Contact

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